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Vertical Channel Analysis of the U.S. Milk Market 
 
Vardges Hovhannisyan*  and  Kyle W. Stiegert 
Abstract 
  The objective of the research in this study is to evaluate the pricing and market conduct of milk 
manufacturers and retailers.  Using data from a U.S. Midwestern state, we estimate a random coefficient 
logit  demand model (RCL) to empirically  investigate a range of possible scenarios in the milk supply 
chain. These include vertical leader-follower model with underlying  Bertrand-Nash pricing,  models 
allowing  for nonlinear pricing contracts, and collusion  scenarios at various levels in the supply chain.  
This study contributes to the literature in the following  ways. First, it generalizes the RCL demand model 
via Box-Cox power transformation. While previous studies rely on ad hoc specified linear indirect utility, 
this procedure allows data to determine the functional form of utility.  Power transformation parameters 
cannot be obtained analytically  with product-level data, given that consumer choices are unobserved. We 
propose an algorithm to estimate the transformation and consumer heterogeneous taste parameters 
sequentially. The model is identified using annual variation in consumer demographics along with cross-
sectional and time series variation in milk  consumption. Finally,  the milk choice set is allowed to vary 
across markets. It should be mentioned that jointly  estimating the manufacturing sector, the vertical 
channel, and the retail sector will more likely  yield reliable estimates of structural parameters vis-à-vis 
studies investigating  food supply chain sectors in isolation. 
        Several key results are obtained from the research. First, the estimate of demand 
“superelasticity”suggests that retailers have incentives to adjust retail markups to enhance their market 
power. Next, supply selection bias associated with imposing  restriction on the demand-side framework is 
shown to have formidable policy  implications.  Namely, empirical  results from the general demand show 
that retailers are more powerful than they would appear otherwise. In the face of high concentration and a 
small presence of Wall-Mart in these markets this seems a plausible scenario. 
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1.  Introduction 
Rising concentration  in U.S.  food retailing  has  the potential to reshape  not only the 
competitive  landscape  in  final  goods,  but  also  vertical  interactions  between  retailers  and 
manufacturers and  horizontal  interactions among  manufacturers.   This  in  turn  has  important 
welfare  implications  for both producers and consumers of  food.  When an  industry  evolves 
toward  greater concentration,  it  usually occurs because  firms either seek  market power  that 
confers higher output prices or lower input prices on its buyers or sellers, or the firm actively 
seeks  scale  or  scope  economies  that  lead  to  more  efficient  welfare  outcomes.    When  two 
vertically aligned industries are concentrated, the vertical channel relating the two can become 
complicated.  For example, if one large retailer is able to use its buying power to reduce its costs, 
the ability of the  manufacturing sector  to react  may  mean  it will  try  to  lower  its own  input 
procurement costs or perhaps it will try to raise its selling price to other retailers. In another 
extreme, a handful of manufacturers may own some of the retail outlets (in gasoline markets) 
with  important  decisions  on  vertical  interactions  and  strategic  variables  being  made  at 
manufacturer-level. In this vertical setup, the vertically integrated manufacturers may also have 
the  incentive  to  charge  higher  prices  to  their  non-integrated  rivals  in  downstream  markets 
(Hastings, 2004;  Hastings and  Gilbert, 2005).  Therefore, studies  that abstract  from  potential 
vertical considerations in accounting for market behavior of participants in the supply chain will 
result  in unreliable  outcomes and policy  implications. 
The primary objective of this study is to empirically analyze the U.S. milk  marketing 
chain with a major emphasis on interactions between milk manufacturers and major retail chains. 
There has been a growing interest in milk markets recently
1, motivated in part by an interesting 
                                                                 
1 This is exemplified  by a recent interest on the part of the USDA and DOJ to better understand the competitive 
structure of milk  markets throughout the nation. 4 
 
dynamics in milk prices at various levels of milk supply chain. Specifically, in many cases farm 
level  milk  prices  manifested  substantial  volatility  with  prices  in  downstream  markets  not 
necessarily  following  the  respective  ups  and  downs.  Moreover,  although  raw  milk  price 
constitutes an important share of the retail-level price, plummeting farm prices in certain periods 
have  gone  in parallel  with relatively stable prices  in the downstream  channels.  This  may be 
suggestive of major retail chains exercising market power against the upstream participants. In 
theory, retailers draw market power not only from increasing retail concentration in the recent 
years, but also strategic use of well-established private label products (PL). The specificity of PL 
products (immunity to intra and inter-brand competition) makes retailers flexible in their dealing 
against  rivals on the  horizontal  landscape,  while enhancing  their bargaining power  vertically 
(Steiner,  2004). 
Our empirical investigation of implications of structural changes for milk supply chain is 
based on analysis of a U.S. Midwestern state. This constitutes a rather concentrated market at the 
retail level
2 with a handful of large manufacturers accounting for a major share of milk products; 
therefore, we employ vertical oligopolistic models to study its dynamics using product-level data 
from the Information Resources Incorporated (IRI). In spite of many research studies exploring 
the U.S. milk market, only a few make use of recent methodological developments in supply and 
demand analysis to evaluate the  market behavior of  the supply chain participants (see  for 
example Lopez and Lopez, 2009; Richards et al., 2010). This would make possible not only 
brand level analysis that builds upon realistic consumer substitution  patterns, but would also 
allow obtaining  direct estimates  of market behavior of economic agents in question.  
                                                                 
2 Three major  retail chains collectively account for more than 70 % of the total market  share in these markets. In 
addition, we observe the same chains for the entire period of the study, which allows for tracking their behavior over 
time. 5 
 
Milk  demand  is  modeled  via  a  random  coefficient  logit  specification  (RCL)  (Berry, 
Levinsohn,  and  Pakes  (BLP),  1995;  Nevo,  2001;  Nakamura  and  Zerom,  2010;  Bonnet  and 
Dubois, 2009; 2010) taking into account vertical interactions of milk manufacturers and major 
retail chains. Following a menu approach (Bresnahan, 1987; Gasmi et al., 1992), we then use the 
demand estimates to navigate through several supply scenarios that include vertical leader-follower 
model  with  underlying  Bertrand-Nash  pricing,  models  allowing  for  nonlinear  pricing  contracts,  and 
collusion scenarios at various levels in the supply chain. This study extends a seminal work by Villas-
Boas (2007) that allows obtaining market conduct estimates for milk manufacturers and retailers 
without having access to wholesale-level milk prices. Previous studies, on the other hand, relied 
to a major extent on a conjectural variation approach in the spirit of Newly Empirical Industrial 
Organization  (NEIO)
3  to  explore  the  competitive  nature  in  an  industry  or  across  several 
industries at a retail level (see for example, Hyde and Perloff, 1998), or in a vertical context (for 
example,  Kadiyali  et  al.,  2002;  Chintagunta  et  al.,  2002).  While  the  conjectural  variation 
framework gives an idea of where markets stand in relation to perfect competition or monopoly 
(values of conjectural  variation parameter  lying between the two extreme scenarios are  not 
interpretable), the novelty of the above approach is that it allows obtaining a direct estimate of 
market conduct and pricing behavior (as measured by a Lerner Index (LI) of price over marginal 
cost markup).  
Our choice of a random utility discrete choice  framework for modeling milk demand is 
justified by its flexibility in handling a potentially large number of products. This is because milk 
demand  is  projected  on  v arious  attributes  of  milk  unlike  neoclassical  demand  systems.
4 
                                                                 
3 An exception is a study by Sudhir (2001),  which explores manufacturer behavior in a vertical context allowing a 
strategic retailer in the market. 
4 Almost Ideal Demand Systems of Deaton and Muellbauer  (1980), for example,  are plagued with the curse of 
dimensionality, as the budget share equ ations are functions of prices of products in the system. 6 
 
Moreover, modeling somewhat realistic substitution patterns is crucial for the economic effects, 
which  underlie  the estimates of  market power.  This  fact substantiates the choice of an  RCL 
demand;  which allows consumers to  have correlated choices  across products offered  in each 
market  (substitution pattern  is allowed  to be a  function of consumer demographics and  milk 
attributes). 
This  study  contributes  to  the  literature  in  the  following  important  ways.  First  and 
foremost,  it  generalizes the  RCL demand specification while  the contributions of  all known 
previous studies focus on the supply side (see for example Villas-Boas, 2007; Nakamura and 
Zerom, 2010; Bonnet and Dubois, 2010). Specifically,  instead of specifying  an ad hoc  linear 
indirect utility function, we allow the data to determine the functional form of the indirect utility. 
As a result, the  indirect utility  may take any  form between  logarithmic and  linear  functional 
specifications. To do so, we power transform the indirect utility function via Box-Cox procedure 
that allows  modeling potential diminishing  marginal  utility of  milk attributes (Box and Cox, 
1964).  Although  the  importance  of  generalizing  demand  models  via  power  transformations 
cannot be underestimated, only a study by Orro et al., (2005) employs a similar framework to 
test across various specifications of transportation demand. However, they rely on  consumer-
level data; which allow obtaining estimates of power transformation parameters analytically. The 
current study, on the contrary, uses product-level data (actual consumer choices are unobserved 
to the researcher) which provide no guidance as to how power transform the demand function 
empirically.  The importance of  the major contribution of this manuscript is that it proposes a 
numerical  algorithm  to  estimate  power  transformation  and  consumer  heterogeneous  taste 
parameters altogether.   7 
 
Secondly, unlike previous studies, we model annual variation in consumer demographics 
along  with  cross-sectional  and  time  series  variation  in  milk  consumption.  Furthermore,  the 
choice set for milk is allowed to vary across markets. These will likely enhance the identification 
power of the  model and  help pin down the elasticity  measures  underlying the  market power 
estimates. 
With the increasing prevalence of the RCL demand specification in NEIO studies, the 
supply model selection bias may well have a  formidable impact on policy implications. More 
specifically, the results support a conjecture that major retail chains are more powerful than they 
would appear  under  the  less  general  model of demand. Given the concentration  level of  this 
market and the small presence of Wall-Mart (less than 5 % of total market share), this seems a 
plausible scenario. The findings from similar studies (for example Villas-Boas, 2007; Bonnet and 
Dubois, 2010) suggest that retailers have, indeed, reshaped the vertical competitive landscape to 
their advantage. Furthermore, Steiner (2004) provides a careful discussion of possible factors 
behind  this reality. 
The remainder of this manuscript proceeds as follows. The next section presents the basic 
RCL  demand  model  and  the  power  transformation  technique,  along  with  several  models  of 
interaction among the downstream players. Section three presents estimation details of the basic 
demand,  and  the  numerical  algorithm  for  estimating  the  generalized  demand  specification. 
Section four briefly discusses the market-level data used in this study. Empirical results follow 
immediately.  The final  section  concludes  and provides some suggestions  for future  work. 
2.  Methodology 
To model the demand for milk  we rely upon an RCL specification  (Berry, Levinsohn  and 
Pakes, 1995; Nevo, 2001; Nakamura and Zerom, 2010) that is flexible  enough  to approximate 8 
 
any random utility  model (McFadden and Train,  2000). More precisely,  we generalize  the RCL 
demand via Box-Cox power transformation;  which  allows  the underlying  indirect  utility  function 
to range from a linear  to a logarithmic  form (Box and Cox, 1964; Orro et al., 2005). Using  two-
step procedure (Goldberg  and Verboven, 2001) we then take the demand estimates  to several 
models of interactions  among  downstream  players in milk  supply  chain that extend from 
Stackelberg  in Bertrand-Nash to a vertical  monopoly.  Given  the non-nested  nature of supply 
scenarios  considered here a relevant  testing  procedure by Rivers  and Vuong (2002) is performed 
next with the aim of determining  the vertical  competitive  atmosphere  in milk  markets. 
2.1.  Basic demand  specification 
Milk  demand  is  modeled  using  a  discrete  choice  framework  where  consumers  are 
assumed to make a choice from (N + 1) alternatives comprised of N products and an outside 
option (no purchase at all or purchase at other outlets excluded from this study). Products are 
defined  as  unique  combinations  of  milk  manufacturers,  major  retail  chains  operating  in 
respective markets, and the fat content of milk. Furthermore, we assume that consumers have a 
quasi-linear  utility  function (income  effects are absent)  with a corresponding  indirect  utility 
specified  as: 
jt i jt i jt ijt j
ijt
i0t







where ijt U is the indirect utility that consumer i derives from choice j in  market  t = 1, 2, ... , T , 
jt x represents the observed product characteristics other than milk price (such as the milk fat 
content, organic, lactose free),  jt p is the price of 
th j milk in market t,  jt ξ embeds unobserved (by 
the  researcher)  milk  characteristics  also  known  as  milk  quality,  ijt ε represents  attributes 9 
 
unobservable by the consumer, and   j c {0,1}  denotes a purchase of milk from the choice set at 
value 1, and outside option otherwise. For reasons mentioned below,  ijt ε is assumed to be mean 
zero,  and  distributed  independently  and  identically  according  to  a  type  I  Extreme  Value  
distribution. 
Consumer taste heterogeneity  is allowed to  incorporate systematic, as well  as random 











where α and β are the mean population parameters of the marginal utility/disutility of price and 
other  product  attributes  modeled,  i D and i  are  observed  and  unobserved  consumer 
demographics (normally assumed to follow a standard normal distribution), respectively,  and 
 measure heterogeneity in consumer tastes. This allows the choice set in a given market to be 
meaningfully correlated for each consumer; which results in realistic substitution patterns. This 
feature of the RCL models cannot be underestimated in the empirical IO, where the economic 
effects  play a key role in obtaining  market power estimates. 
With the usual assumption of purchase of a product unit j that yields the highest utility for 
a given choice set in the market t, one obtains the respective probability for individual i as given 
by:
5 
   
x β -p ʱ + ξ N x β -p ʱ + ξ jt i jt i jt mt i mt i mt
ijt m=1
P = e 1+ e (3)   
The predicted demand for milk j in market t is then computed by aggregating individual 
probabilities  over the distribution  of consumer  taste heterogeneity  as follows: 
                                                                 
5 The analytical formula for purchase probability is obtained by virtue of the distributional assumptions on  ijt ε . 10 
 
  jt ijt i it it jt ijt ikt 1 2 3 1




    
Finally,  we  use  the  following  formulas  to  estimate  the  own  and  cross  price  elasticity 
measures: 
jt




i ijt ikt 1 2
jt
p
ʱ s (1-s ) dF (D ) dF (Z)       if k=j
s s p
η = = (5)
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2.2.   General demand specification 
The  choice  of  the  linear  indirect  utility  function  underlying  the  basic  RCL  demand 
specification is clearly ad hoc. Furthermore, its functional form is restrictive in that it implies 
constant marginal utility of product attributes. More specifically, any change in the milk fat value 
affects the milk choice probabilities independently of the initial level of milk consumed. This 
seems restrictive in the light of increasing health consciousness in the U.S., where one would 
expect  consumers  deriving  lower  marginal  utility  from  incremental  milk  consumption  (see 
Gaudry (2010) for a thorough  discussion  of constant  marginal  utility  assumption).   
We generalize the RCL demand by allowing the data to determine the functional form of 
the indirect utility (Gaudry and Willis, 1978). To do so, we power transform indirect utility via 
Box-Cox  procedure  allowing  it  to  embrace  a  range  of  functional  forms  extending  from 
logarithmic  to  linear  (Blayac,  2003;  Orro  et  al.,  2005).  Thus,  if  the  linear  formulation  is 
outperformed by competing alternatives then empirical evidence supports diminishing marginal 
utility. 
The  Box-Cox  power  transformation  can  be  applied  to  some  or  all  of  the  product 
characteristics  that accept strictly  positive  values as follows  (Box and Cox, 1964; Train,  2003): 11 
 
(λ) jt
ijt i jt i jt ijt jt






x = (7) λ






    
Exponential parameters  jt λ can be specified to be the same for all product attributes, or in 
a more general setting they would vary across product characteristics. These parameters need to 
be estimated along with consumer heterogeneous taste parameters; however, unlike in studies 
that rely upon observed consumer behavior (for example Orro et al., 2005), market-level data do 
not allow obtaining them analytically. Therefore, we propose a numerical algorithm to estimate 
the demand parameters simultaneously  by means of three levels of sequential  optimization. 
2.3.  Supply Models 
Supply scenarios considered in this study range from Stackelberg in Bertrand-Nash to 
vertical  monopoly  between  milk  manufacturers  and  major  retail  chains  (Villas-Boas,  2007; 
Bonnet and Dubois, 2010). While not exhaustive, these should provide a fairly broad coverage of 
vertical  interactions  in the downstream  channels  of milk  marketing  system.   
2.3.1 Stackelberg in Bertrand-Nash (double marginalization) 
        This  is  a  simple  linear  pricing  scenario  with  a  handful  of  Nash-Bertrand  milk 
manufacturers and retail chains engaged in oligopolistic competition, moreover, manufacturers 
make  the  first  move.  Given  this  structure  of  a  game,  equilibrium  prices  are  solved  for  via 
backward induction  where retailer  optimality  conditions  are obtained first.   
The retailer  e in market t is characterized  by the following  profit  function 
 
we
et it it it it iI et
π p - p - c s (p) (8)

   12 
 
Where et I represents product offerings by retailer e in market t, 
w
it p is the wholesale price of 
product i, 
e
it c is the marginal cost of producing i by retailer e, and  it s (p) is the 
th i product’s 
market  share  in  market  t.  The  pure  strategy  equilibrium  Bertrand-Nash  prices  then  can  be 
obtained by differentiating  (8) with  respect to respective retail-level  prices as follows: 
 
we kt
it kt kt kt et e kI et it
s




   
Where  e n  is  the  number  of  active  retail  chains  in  market  t.  Stacking  together  optimality 
conditions for all products in et I  , one can obtain price over marginal cost markup for retailer e in 
market t as specified  below:   
 
-1 we
t t t e et t e
ω t
p - p - c = - O *Δ s (p) for e = 1, ..., n (10)  
Where  e O is the retailer e’s ownership  matrix,  et Δ is a matrix of  first-order derivatives of the 
market shares with respect to  retail prices, and * represents element by element multiplication 
operator. 
By the same token, taking retailer optimality conditions as given, manufacturer markups 
can be obtained as follows: 
 
-1 ww
t t w w t t w
τt
p -c = - O *Δ s (p) for w  = 1, ..., m (11)  
where  w m  is the number of milk manufacturers supplying to market t, 
w
t c is a vector of marginal 
costs  incurred  by  manufacturer  w,  w O displays  its ownership structure, and  wt Δ (p(w )) is  a 
matrix  reflecting  manufacturer’s  response to variations  in retail  prices: 
ww
kt kt kt kt kt kt s (p(w)) p = ( s p ) ( p p ) (12)        13 
 
Sensitivity of manufacturer prices to changes in retail prices, represented by
w
kt kt pp  , is 
generally unknown in practical applications, given the fact that manufacturer/wholesale level 
prices are rarely observed. Therefore, it is imperative to express the response matrix solely in 
terms of observables (retail prices, actual market shares, and ownership structure). To do so, we 
totally differentiate the 
th j equation  in (9) with  respect to retailer prices  k dp , k=1,..., n and a 
wholesale  price 
w
m p  with variation
w
m dp : 
2
j w e w i k m
e i i i e k e m i
k j k j j k=1
h(j,m ) g(j,k)
s s s s
+ O (i,j)(p -p -c ) +O (k,j) dp - O (m ,j) dp = 0 (13)
p p p p p
     
 
        
  
Applying  the  above  procedure  to  each  optimality  condition  in  (9)  and  stacking  together  their 
respective  relationships  as  in  (13),  we  obtain
w
mm G dp-H dp = 0 ,  where  G  is  a  matrix  with 
elements g (j, k), and  m H  is a vector of dimension n with elements h (j, m). The
th m column of 
manufacturer sensitivity matrix is then given by
w1
mm dp/ dp = G H
 , combining all n columns of 
which yield the full sensitivity matr ix as
1
p =G H




Δ =Δ Δ ,  the  substitution  of  which  into  (11)  yields  the  implied  markups  for 
manufacturers.   
2.3.2 Hybrid model 
The only difference between the hybrid and Stackelberg Bertrand-Nash models is that 
retail  chains  own  private  label  milk.  Under  this  ownership  structure  retailers  eliminate 
manufacturer markup for private labels which puts some competitive pressure on national brand 14 
 
milk. Retail markups, therefore, remain unchanged as in (10), while manufacturer markups are 
expectedly  lower than in (11) as provided below: 
 
-1
w e w h h
t t t w wt t p - c - c = - O *Δ s (p) (14)  
Where 
h
w O is  the  manufacturer  ownership  matrix  excluding  the  entries  for  private  labels, 
and
h
t s (p) are the shares of national  brand milk 
2.3.3 Nonlinear pricing models 
Two alternative nonlinear pricing models considered here allow for perfectly competitive 
manufacturers with retailers being the only profit maximizing channel (manufacturers may later 
extract a part or full retail rents via two-part tariffs), and vice versa. This is because identification 
of markups for downstream two channels when they compete imperfectly in a nonlinear pricing 
context is a major issue (Bonnet  et al., 2009).  
With  perfectly  competitive  manufacturers,  they  obtain  zero  markups,  while  retail 
markups are:  
 
-1 ew
t t t e et t p - c - c = - O *Δ s (p) (15)  
In the second sub-scenario, retailers receive zero markups, and  manufacturers claim the 
vertical  markup for each product they offer: 
 
-1 ew
t t t w et t p - c - c = - O *Δ s (p) (16)
 
Exploring possible mechanisms according to which the downstream channels redistribute 
their profits may be an interesting  area of study, which is not pursued here. 
2.3.4 Collusion at manufacturer level 
This scenario assumes that manufacturers maximize their joint profit, with retailers still 
pursuing  their  individual  interests.  This results  in retailers  receiving  the same  markup as  in 15 
 
Stackelberg Nash-Bertrand provided by  (10). Manufacturers’  markups, on the other  hand,  is 
given by (11), with the only difference being in the manufacturer ownership  matrix, which is 
now full  of ones.  
2.3.5 Collusion at retailer level 
By symmetry, markups accruing to manufacturers are specified by (11), and those for 
retailers  are as in (10), provided that retailer  ownership  matrix  is all ones. 
2.3.6 Vertical collusion / monopoly 
In this extreme scenario manufacturers and retail chains act as one enterprise maximizing 
joint profit.  In other terms, they come together to extract monopoly  rents given  by: 
 
-1 ew
t t t 1 et t p - c - c = - O *Δ s (p) (17)  
2.4.   Testing Procedure 
Given the non nested nature of the supply models in question, we perform a non-nested 
testing procedure to infer on the nature of competition in downstream channels. For that purpose 
we  first  estimate  manufacturer jt (ω)  and  retailer jt (τ)  markups  for  the  supply  scenarios 
considered, and obtain implied vertical marginal costs (sum of milk production and marketing 
related marginal  costs) for the respective  supply  models as follows: 
it it it it m c  = p - (ω + τ ) (18)
   Statistical inference is then based upon pair-wise comparisons of marginal cost functions 
from various supply models: 
A A A A
it i1t iψt it
B B B B
it i1t iψt it
m c  =  f (c , ..., c ) + ι
  (19)







Where A and  B denote the null and alternative hypothesis,  i1t iψt c , ..., c represent stochastic cost 
shocks observed by the researcher, f is a total marginal cost function assumed to be additively 
separable in manufacturer and retailer-level cost components, and it ι is an unobservable random 
shock to the cost.  
Non nested test procedure proposed by Rivers a nd Vuong (2002) is then conducted to 
infer on the nature of downstream competition in milk markets. This provides a very general 
testing  framework  since  the  stochastic  marginal  cost  functions  (19)  are  allowed  to  be 
incompletely specified; moreover, neither specification is assumed to be true under the null 
hypothesis (unlike a Cox-type test developed by Smith (1992) for models estimated via GMM). 
The test statistic  measures  the distance between the  lack -of-fit criteria  from  the competing 
stochastic marginal cost functions that are estimated via NLS or GMM, with the identifying 
assumption that observed cost shocks  i1t iψt c , ..., c  are orthogonal  to the unobserved shock 
it
ι  
(Rivers  and Vuong,  2002; Bonnet  and Dubois, 2009; 2010). The test statistic  is provided below: 
A A B B
T t 3 t 3
T
T
R = (θ ) (θ )

   







tt ( ) , ( )

 are  minimands employed  in  the estimation of competing  marginal cost 
functions  evaluated  at  the  optimal  values  of  cost  parameters  from  the  respective  models 
(i.e.,
AB
33 θ , θ

), and  T 

represents a consistent estimator of the limiting variance of difference between 
the lack-of-fit criteria normalized by  T . Under some regularity conditions Rivers and Vuong show that 
T R has a standard normal distribution. A given pair of models is assumed to be asymptotically 
equivalent  under the null  hypothesis  given  by: 17 
 
A A B B
0 t 3 t 3 H : lim (θ ) (θ ) 0
n
   


    

 
 The alternative hypothesis maintaining that model under A outperforms B (resp. B outperforms 
A) are presented as: 
A A B B A A B B
1 t 3 t 3 2 t 3 t 3 H : lim (θ ) (θ ) 0 , H : lim (θ ) (θ ) 0
nn
       
   
   
           
   
 
Given the non transitive nature of the tests, it should be kept in mind that no single model 
is assured a priori to outperform  all the competing  alternatives  (Bonnet and Dubois, 2010). 
3.  Estimation 
An estimable system of demand is obtained by equating the actual and predicted market 
shares. Estimation follows a simulated GMM procedure given that demand equations (4) can not 
be  integrated  analytically.  An  important  issue  that  arises  in  the  process  is  the  difficulty  in 
constructing GMM moment conditions because of nonlinear nature of demand. Specifically, the 
structural errors  jt ξ enter the demand equations in a highly nonlinear fashion, which makes it 
impossible to employ usual GMM techniques that are applicable in a linear world. Therefore, we 
rely upon a contraction mapping proposed by BLP (1995). For an expositional ease, the indirect 
utility  in  (1)  is  rearranged  into  mean  utility  that  is  common  across  consumers  of  product 
j jt (i.e., δ) , and  ijt μ that accounts for consumer  heterogeneity.    
ijt jt jt jt jt jt i i ijt
δμ jt (x , p , ξ ; θ ) ijt (x , p , D , v ; θ2) jt jt jt 1 jt jt i i
U = x β - p ʱ + ξ + [-p , x ] ( Π D +Σv ) +ε (19)
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Estimation  algorithm  obtains  estimates  of  the  linear  1 (i.e., θ) and  nonlinear 
parameters 2 (i.e., θ)  sequentially. For a given set of  2  θ values, it can be shown that a unique 
vector of  jt ξ  equates observed and predicted shares. 
 
p h+1 h a h
jt jt jt 2 jt jt
jt jt jt jt
δ = δ + log s -log s (δ ,θ ) (20)
ξ = δ - (x β - p ʱ) (21)  
With the vector of structural errors  jt ξ at hand we then proceed to constructing moment 





min ξ(θ ) Z ʦ Z ξ(θ ) (22) wh
Where  Z is a matrix  of instrumental  variables,  and    is some weight  matrix. 
Price endogeneity  is another  issue. It stems  from simultaneous determination of  milk 
supply and demand in a structural framework. In addition, some important variables, such as 
advertising, specialty milk attributes (for example organic, lactose-free) are unobserved, which 
causes omitted variable bias. Lastly, unit prices of milk are imputed as a ratio of total amount 
spent to respective  quantities.  This  reinforces  price endogeneity  through  measurement  error bias.  
To account  for  the  mean  utility jt δ , we  use product  fixed effects  that capture observed and 
unobserved milk attributes (i.e., part of  jt ξ that is constant). Unobserved attributes that vary over 
products and markets (such as promotional activities and  consumer preference changes that are 
not observed by the researcher, denoted by  jt Δξ ) are still likely to be correlated with milk prices 
(Nevo, 2001). Therefore, we  employ  instrumental  variable approach  to account  for potential 
price  endogeneity.  Specifically,  we  use  product  fixed  effects  interacted  with  various  cost 
components  at the manufacturer  and retailer  level  (Villas-Boas,  2007).  19 
 
The addition of Box-Cox parameters to the model adds another level of difficulty to the 
estimation procedure.  Unlike studies  using consumer-level data (Orro et al., 2005),  it  is  not 
possible to obtain Box-Cox parameter estimates analytically.
6 Therefore, this is the first study to 
propose a numerical algorithm to obtain λ estimates. More specifically, we add another loop of 
grid search to the basic algorithm  (Nevo, 2000) to obtain  the estimates of Box-Cox ( λ ) and 
consumer  heterogeneous  taste parameters ( 12 θ , θ ) in a series of sequential  optimization. 
i.  For each starting value of parameter λ  obtain the corresponding starting values for the  2 θ  
parameters  via basic algorithm  (Nevo, 2000).  This  is done one at  a time  for each 
parameter in  2 θ (here 15 nonlinear  parameters) 
ii.  Use each initial value of  λ  and its corresponding  2 θ  parameters to obtain the estimates 
of  1 θ  parameters, which are used in turn to estimate optimal 2 θ along with the value of 
GMM objective function  (via basic algorithm). 
iii.  Repeat i-ii for all initial values ofλ . One way to go about it is do a grid search, as from 
the economic  theory   λ 0,1  . 
iv.  Compare the  GMM objective  values computed  with different sets of  initial  values of 
λ and  2 θ parameters, and choose the set with the smallest  GMM objective value. 
It should be mentioned that time required to run the algorithm above is not very different 
from that of the basic model as in Nevo, (2000), especially that we use Halton draws from the 
standard normal distribution (Bhat, 1999). We present some more details on this aspect of the 
proposed algorithm  in the empirical  results section. 
4.  Data 
                                                                 
6 Box-Cox  parameter estimates are functions of consumer observed choices, while I do not observe individual 
purchase decisions 20 
 
Data used in this study come from several sources. Weekly plain  milk  sales, average 
price, and milk  characteristics  dataset is provided by the Information  Resources Incorporated 
(IRI). It contains  market-level  observations  on milk  sold at four large supermarket  chains  in two 
IRI city-markets  in a U.S. Midwestern  state from 2001 to 2006. The markets in question  have 
been rather concentrated in the period under study. Three major retailers  accounted for around 
70 % of the total market share (two retailer  chains operate in both markets).  Particularly,  the 
retailer  3 seems a dominant  player in both IRI city-markets  with  an average 35 % market share 
(Market Scope, Trade Dimensions, years 2001 to 2006). Its role in the milk  marketing  can not be 
underestimated  given  its market share of over 52 % in the sample (table 1), while  the rest of 
retail  chains  under study have relatively  lower market shares (over 14 %, 11 %, and 5 % for 
retailers  4, 1, and 2, respectively).   
An important  limitation  of this  dataset is that only two of the three leading  retail  chains 
are covered for each IRI city in question.  The market shares of the outside  option in the sample 
(difference  between the total market share and aggregate  share of milks  in the choice set) seem 
realistic  in this light  and compare well with  those from similar  studies  (over 56 % and 62% in 
two IRI cities,  respectively).  Another issue is that specialty  milk  attributes  (for example  organic, 
lactose free) are missing  for a considerable  number  of observations,  so we do not consider them 
in this  study but rather focus on milk  fat. This attribute  of milk  should  be an important 
determinant of milk consumption in the light of increasing health conscience in the U. S. recently. 
Products are defined as unique combinations of milk manufacturer-retailer chain-milk fat 
content; which results in 57 products in the two IRI markets (table 2). Prices and quantities of 
milk sold are obtained by aggregating  from  weekly to  four-week periods. We,  furthermore, 
deflate prices from 2002 onwards using an aggregate CPI measure for urban areas. Private label 21 
 
milk is the cheapest option in the choice set, while lactose free milk provided by manufacturer 3 
and organic milk by manufacturer 5 are relatively more expensive in the sample. To obtain the 
actual market shares of milk in the choice set we define the market size as a product of U.S. per 
capita milk consumption and the size of populations (Market Scope) in respective IRI market-
cities from 2001 through 2006. Market shares simply represent the ratio of quantities of milk 
sold (expressed in servings, i.e. 220 ounces of milk per person in a four-week period) to the 
potential  market demand.  The share of the  outside  good  is then the difference between the 
market size and the actual market shares.  
The IRI dataset was supplemented  by data on cost components  of milk  production, 
specifically  the electricity  (industrial)  and gasoline  prices, average wages of employees  in food 
sector, and Class I milk  price.
7 As for retailer cost components,  we use the retail-level  electricity 
prices, Federal funds effective  interest rates, and retailer  total sales provided in the IRI dataset.  
Finally, samples of demographics from the joint distribution of consumer characteristics were 
taken from the Current Population Survey (CPS) that is available from the U.S. Bureau of Labor. 
This is the first known study to allow for annual d emographic variation which enhances the 
identifying  power  of  the  model.  Overall  1200  consumers  from  different  households  were 
sampled in both IRI city markets. The consumer demographics include total household income, 
age of the household  head, and the number of children  less than 18 years of age. 
5.  Empirical  Results 
Results from a logit and IV logit demand models are presented in table 3. Price and milk 
fat coefficients are negative and statistically significant for all specifications. Results from the 
Hausman exogeneity test provide a strong support to the conjecture that milk price is endogenous. 
                                                                 
7 Data on energy, wages were collected from the official  website of BLS,  Energy Information Administration, and 
the fluid grade milk  price came from  the Dairy Markets website (AAE Department, UW-Madison) 22 
 
To  control  for  price  endogeneity,  we  employ  a  set  of  manufacturer  and  retail  level  cost 
components, which  are  found to be valid  instruments (F-value associated with  instruments  is 
82.2, while the critical value at 5 % significance is 10). Comparing the price coefficients under 
the respective columns shows that the IV approach corrects the upward endogeneity bias in milk 
price.   
The RCL demand  is estimated  via simulated GMM procedure that accounts  for price 
endogeneity  following  the  estimation  algorithm  proposed  earlier.  We  simulate  consumer 
unobservable characteristics   in (2) using Halton draws from a standard normal distribution. 
This procedure minimizes simulation error and reduces the run time for the model substantially 
(Bhat, 1999; Train, 1999).
8  With only milk fat being observed in my sample, we apply the Box-
Cox power transformation to this attribute. Nevertheless, the estimatio n time does not change 
with multiple attributes being power transformed, as long as  λ is not allowed to vary across the 
various  attributes.   
The estimation  results show that the  logarithmic specification outperforms the rest of 
possible  functional  forms, which  attests to consumers  having diminishing  marginal  utility  of 
milk fat. This is in contrast to previous studies (for example BLP, 1995; Nevo, 2001; Villas-Boas, 
2007; Nakamura and Zerom, 2010; Bonnet et al., 2009; Bonnet and Dubois, 2010) which rely on 
ad  hoc  specified  linear  indirect  utility  function.  Given  its  empirical  superiority,  the  major 
analyses  are based upon the logarithmic  specification  of the RCL model.
9  
The results from the  RCL demand model are presented in table  4. The majority of the 
parameter  estimates  are  statistically  significant  with  their  signs  conforming  to   theoretical 
expectations. The results show that consumer heterogeneous taste for milk attributes, such as fat 
                                                                 
8 For a given λ , it takes the model two hours to run, whereas we use ten  λ  initial values 
9 Results from other specifications are available upon request 23 
 
content and price,  is  mostly accounted  for by observed demographics. Price  has a  large and 
significant  negative  impact  on  the  milk  purchase  of  an  average  consumer  (-17.88),  which 
becomes even more so for households with children below 18 years of age (-5.45). However, 
price does not seem to be as important for households with older heads (3.35), which may have 
to do  their  increased  need  for specialty  milk (for  example, older people are  more  likely to 
develop lactose-intolerance and lactose-free milk becomes a necessity for them). The distribution 
of consumer valuation of milk price is presented in figure 1a. These measures extend from -57 to 
0.78 with a  vast  majority of consumers deriving disutility  from  the price and only  less than 
0.01  %  derives  utility  from  it.  The  value  of  milk  fat  diminishes  with  increasing  per  capita 
incomes across households (-0.91), and older household heads (-0.55). In the light of increased 
health conscience and likely reduction in physical activity, older consumers may prefer lower fat 
milk. Milk fat distribution is almost symmetric and resembles a normal distribution with mean 
zero (figure 1b). Given that unobserved demographics do not explain the consumer valuation of 
milk fat, this speaks to a fact that milk fat is horizontally differentiated. More specifically, milk 
consumers  seem  to  derive  utility  from  the  amount  of  milk  fat  that  corresponds  to  their 
preferences for this attribute, while possible discrepancies yield them disutility.
10 The significant 
positive point estimates of heterogeneity in the mean utility jt δ , contributed by per capita income 
(1.95),  household  head’s  age  (0.27),  and  number  of  children  below  18  (3.46),    imply  that 
relatively richer households with older heads and more children derive higher utility from milk in 
choice set than from the outside option.   
Elasticity  estimates  from multinomial  logit  and RCL demand are presented in table 5. 
Own-price elasticities  for the logit  model (column  1) vary significantly  across the milk 
                                                                 
10 In many cases horizontally differentiated products are priced uniformly,  which seems to be the case for milk  with 
different milk  fat content 24 
 
manufacturers  ( from  -3.95  for the milk  by manufacturer  3  to as high  as -1.13 for the private 
labels).  This supports the conjecture  that specialty  milk  (such as lactose free, organic  produced 
by manufacturers  3 and 4) are viewed as luxury  products relative  to regular  milk.  However, 
elaticity  measures from logit  demand should  not be relied upon in many  situations  given  the 
unrealistic  nature of their substitution  patterns (for example,  retailer  2 has the lowest (in absolute 
value)  own-price elasticity,  which  is accounted for by its relatively  lower market share). RCL 
own-price elasticities,  unlike  logit  estimates  (-2.47), are not much  apart across manufacturers. 
However, private labels are still  the least elastic  products, while  lactose free milk  is the most 
elastic  (-2.84). Interestingly,  demand for private  label products is the most sensitive  to changes in 
national  brand milk  prices (0.10), which  implies  that consumers  would rather substitute  retail 
brands of milk  for manufacturer  brands in case any of the latter sees an increase in price. 
Following  the  two-step  procedure,  we  estimate  the  demand  model  once  and  use  the 
demand estimates to navigate through the supply models considered in this study (Goldberg and 
Verboven,  2001).  This  allows  for  obtaining  manufacturer  and  retailer  level  market  power 
estimates implied by different supply scenarios, even though manufacturer marginal costs are 
unobserved. Market power is measured by Lerner Index of price over marginal cost markup. 
Table 6 reports total vertical Lerner Index and recovered marginal cost estimates across supply 
interaction  scenarios.  Lerner  Index  ranges  from  the  lowest  38  %  in  the  manufacturer  level 
collusion to as high as 77.8 % in a vertical cartel. The markup distribution is rather flat for the 
manufacturer collusion scenario, and it is even possible to observe negative markups as in Villas-
Boas (2007).
11As for the marginal cost estimates implied by various scenarios, they extend from 
10.6 cents per half a pint in manufacturer  collusion  to 24 cents in retail collusion. 
                                                                 
11 Even if the underlying model is assumed to be true, negative markups can be observed for products that have been 
loss leaders for milk  manufacturers and/or retailers in certain markets 25 
 
Results  from the Rivers  and Vuong  (2002) non-nested test procedure for the basic and 
generalized  RCL demand models are presented in table 7. More specifically,  these are test 
statistic  values  obtained from pairwise  comparison  of incompletely  specified  models in (18). For 
a given  pair of models, a test statistic  value  being  less than the lower bound of a critical  value  (-
1.64 at 5 % significance  level)   implies  the model under null  is correctly  specified,  while  a test 
statistic  exceeding  the upper bound (1.64) is supportive  of the alternative  model. Any value of 
test statistic  between the critical  values  implies  both models are specified  correctly. Results  from 
the basic RCL demand model (upper part of table 7) show that at 5 % level  of significance  the 
hybrid  model outperforms  all competing  scenarios, while  the manufacturer  collusion  provides 
the worst fit. Outcomes from a more general  RCL demand change  the predicition  of the testing 
procedure drastically  (lower part of table 7). Namely,  a nonlinear  pricing  model with powerful 
retailers  (3.1) turns out superior to competing  scenarios  at 5 % level  of significance,  while 
manufacturer-level  collusion  being  the most unlikely  scenario.  The test results are robust to 
estimation procedure (NLS, GMM) and functional form of the marginal cost (exponential, linear). 
The fact that retailers  have been reshaping  the vertical  competitive  structure  to their 
advantage  is buttressed by findings  from previous  studies  (see for example  Villas-Boas,  2007; 
Bonnet and Dubois,  2010). Moreover, the retail  level  cross price elasticity  estimates  in this study 
(table 5) are rather small,  which  supports the conjecture  that retailers  are not engaged  in a tough 
competition  (same is true for PL milk).  Admittedley,  however, supply  models considered  here do 
not provide an exhaustive  representation  of manufacturer  and retailer  interactions  in a vertical 
context. Neither do most scenarios  specify  how retail  chains might  use national  brand (NB) and 
PL milk  differently  on horizontal  and vertical  competitive  landscapes  (for example  retailers  may 
use strong PL strategically  against  manufacturers  to negotiate  lower invoice  prices for NB milk). 26 
 
Therefore,  the finding  of manufacturers  competing  perfectly,  while  letting  retailers  claim  the 
vertical  markups, may well be the outcome of major retail  chains  successfully  using  their  store 
brands. 
It is believed  that the emergence  of PL products empowered major retailers  both on the 
horizontal  and vertical  competitive  landscape  (Berge’s-Sennou,  2006). Steiner (2004) presents 
some historic  evidence  that supports this conjecture.  Specifically,  while  NB prices are defined  to 
an important  extent by inter-brand  competition,  PL prices seem to be rather flexible  for the 
following  reasons: 
i.  Stores in a chain price the PL products uniformly  in a given  market, which  rules out 
intra-brand  competition.     
ii.  Unlike  NB products, PLs are mostly  immune  to inter-brand  competition,  simply  because 
retail  chains  do not carry competing  PL brands; moreover,  the latter are not directly 
comparable  in many  cases. Even if they are comparable  for certain products (for example 
milk),  consumers  may perceive them as distinct  store brands. Search costs and store 
loyalty  further  enhance retailer  flexibility  in pricing  PLs. 
Thus, reputable  store brands put retailers  in a position  to negotiate  lower prices not only 
for PLs, but also NB products (Morton and Zettelmeyer,  2000). In the result,  the percentage 
markups for PL are higher  than those for NB products, even though  PL are generally  priced 
lower. Steiner  (2004) defines  this as a major “regularity”  that has prevailed  in all markets 
recently,  and the empirical  results from  this study provide a strong support for this conjecture. 
Namely,  even though  PL milk  is relatively  much cheaper than NB (table 2), markups  on retailer 
markups on PL milk  are much higher  under any scenario (table 8) as suggested  by respective 
elasticity  estimates.   27 
 
Testing  across non-linear  pricing  models that incorporate  finer  details as to how 
participants  in a vertical  chain  interact  would help understand  the potential  sources of market 
power (as in Bonnet and Dubois,  2010). 
Conclusions 
Understanding  competitive  nature in milk  markets has gained in importance  in the face of 
rising  retail  concentration  in the U.S. This is exemplified  by the USDA and DOJ joint  effort to 
better understand  the competitive  atmosphere  in milk  markets, as some of the recent 
developments  in the milk  marketing  system  may have key implications  for milk  accessibility  and 
availability.   
The objective  of this manuscript  is to contribute  to the knowledge  of government 
agencies and other interested parties on the degree of downstream competition in the milk market. 
Specifically, it studies the market conduct of milk manufacturers and major retail chains in a U.S. 
Midwestern  state. Following  the menu  approach, we employ  a random coefficient  logit  demand 
model (RCL) to investigate  several supply  scenarios ranging  from Stackelberg  in Bertrand-Nash 
to vertical  cartel. This study contributes  to the literature  in the following  important  ways. First 
and foremost,  we generalize  the RCL demand model via Box-Cox power transformation.  While 
previous  studies  rely on ad hoc specified  linear  indirect  utility,  this procedure allows  data to 
determine  utility  functional  form. Secondly,  identifying  power of demand is enhanced by 
modeling  annual  variation  in consumer  demographics  along with  cross-sectional  and time series 
variation  in milk  consumption.  Furthermore,  the choice set for milk  is allowed  to vary across 
markets. 
The results  are most supportive  of a supply  scenario in which  manufacturers  pursue their 
interests  as individual  enterprises,  while  retailers  operate as a unity.  The conjecture  of major 28 
 
retail  chains  becoming  relatively  powerful  vis-à-vis  upstream  players is supported by findings 
from similar  studies and anecdotal evidence.  Moreover, the finding  of small  retail  cross price 
effects  in this study implies  little  competition  among major chains.   
Admittedley,  however, supply  models considered in this study do not provide an 
exhaustive  representation  of manufacturer  and retailer  interactions  in a vertical  context.  Neither 
do most scenarios  specify  how retail chains  might  use national  brand (NB) and PL milk 
differently  on horizontal  and vertical  competitive  landscapes. Therefore,  the finding  of powerful 
retailers  vis-à-vis  milk  manufacturers  may well  be the outcome  of major retailers  successfully 
using  their strategic  weapon (PL) against  manufacturers.  To that end, the PL milk  in this study 
conforms  to some “regularities”  (Steiner,  2004), which  is supportive  of PL being  an important 
competitive  tool both on the horizontal  competitive  landscape and vertically.   
   With the increasing  prevalence  of the RCL demand model in empirical  IO, the supply 
model selection  bias may have a formidable  impact on policy  implications.  Specifically,  the 
empirical  results  from the generalized  RCL demand specification  show that major retailers  are 
more powerful  than they would appear otherwise.  Given  the concentration  level  of this market 
and the small  presence of Wall-Mart, this seems a plausible  scenario. 
  An important  limitation  of this  study is that it relies upon static models  of vertical 
relationships.  One way to extend this study is, therefore,  incorporating  dynamic  scenarios, the 
importance  of which  increases  when strategic  considerations  are in place, especially  in highly 
concentrated  (oligopolistic)  markets.
12 Another limitation  is that no distinction  is allowed in the 
way the retail chains market PL and NB products (for example, retailers may use major NB milk 
to attract traffic,  while utilizing  PL milk  strategically  against rival chains  and manufacturers). 
                                                                 
12 Fundamental reasons may also require dynamic supply models, as firms’  own stock may affect their future 
decisions 29 
 
Therefore,  modeling  non-linear  pricing  scenarios that incorporate  finer  details,  as to how 
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Table 1 Descriptive  Statistics  for Products 
Variable    Median  S.D. 
Aggregate  milk  share in IRI city 1 (%)  43.21  4.44 
Aggregate  milk  share in IRI city 2 (%)  37.16  7.92 
Container  size (pint)  5.00  1.74 
Product share across markets (%)  1.47  2.74 
Price (cents/half  a pint)  22.65  14.73 
Aggregate  retailer  market share across markets (%)     
Retailer  1  11.18  5.43 
Retailer  2  5.48  2.79 
Retailer  3  52.38  13.59 
Retailer  4  14.13  3.22 
















Table 2 Products defined  and respective prices 
            Price 
IRI-City  Manufacturer  Retailer  Fat Content  # Markets  Median  S.D. 
1  Manufacturer  1  2  Skim  78  14.73  1.76 
1  Manufacturer  1  2  Reduced  78  14.92  1.80 
1  Manufacturer  1  2  Whole  78  15.08  2.01 
1  Manufacturer  2  1  Skim  78  19.91  2.89 
1  Manufacturer  2  3  Skim  78  41.15  9.07 
1  Manufacturer  2  1  Low  53  39.44  11.94 
1  Manufacturer  2  1  Reduced  78  19.32  2.70 
1  Manufacturer  2  3  Reduced  78  41.78  9.55 
1  Manufacturer  2  1  Whole  78  19.61  1.97 
1  Manufacturer  2  3  Whole  78  41.53  9.31 
1  Manufacturer  3  1  Skim  78  48.12  2.04 
1  Manufacturer  3  3  Skim  78  46.20  3.07 
1  Manufacturer  3  1  Low  41  49.25  2.40 
1  Manufacturer  3  1  Reduced  78  48.34  2.55 
1  Manufacturer  3  3  Reduced  78  46.22  2.90 
1  Manufacturer  3  1  Whole  66  47.20  2.62 
1  Manufacturer  3  3  Whole  78  45.77  2.74 
1  Private Label  1  Skim  71  14.43  1.74 
1  Private Label  3  Skim  78  13.54  1.70 
1  Private Label  3  Low  78  13.58  1.63 
1  Private Label  1  Reduced  71  14.35  1.63 
1  Private Label  3  Reduced  78  14.01  1.86 
1  Private Label  1  Whole  71  14.57  1.63 
1  Private Label  3  Whole  78  13.46  1.81 
2  Manufacturer  4  1  Skim  65  45.86  3.40 
2  Manufacturer  4  1  Low  63  45.80  4.00 
2  Manufacturer  4  1  Reduced  65  45.76  3.55 
2  Manufacturer  4  1  Whole  65  45.91  3.42 
2  Manufacturer  1  2  Skim  78  16.02  1.84 
2  Manufacturer  1  2  Reduced  78  16.65  2.22 
2  Manufacturer  1  2  Whole  78  16.83  2.29 
2  Manufacturer  2  3  Skim  78  39.64  8.10 
2  Manufacturer  2  6  Skim  78  38.94  6.99 
2  Manufacturer  2  6  Low  78  40.72  3.28 
2  Manufacturer  2  3  Reduced  78  40.38  8.35 
2  Manufacturer  2  6  Reduced  78  38.75  7.13 
2  Manufacturer  2  3  Whole  78  39.58  9.01 
2  Manufacturer  2  6  Whole  78  38.83  7.77 35 
 
2  Manufacturer  3  3  Skim  78  45.53  2.63 
2  Manufacturer  3  6  Skim  78  48.15  4.02 
2  Manufacturer  3  3  Low  42  45.92  1.58 
2  Manufacturer  3  6  Low  78  47.20  3.01 
2  Manufacturer  3  3  Reduced  78  45.55  2.57 
2  Manufacturer  3  6  Reduced  78  48.45  4.37 
2  Manufacturer  3  3  Whole  78  45.07  2.50 
2  Manufacturer  3  6  Whole  63  45.41  3.70 
2  Private Label  2  Skim  43  13.12  1.00 
2  Private Label  3  Skim  78  13.97  1.39 
2  Private Label  6  Skim  78  14.87  1.29 
2  Private Label  3  Low  78  13.47  1.40 
2  Private Label  6  Low  78  14.63  1.34 
2  Private Label  2  Reduced  43  13.15  1.00 
2  Private Label  3  Reduced  78  14.12  1.56 
2  Private Label  6  Reduced  78  15.00  1.34 
2  Private Label  2  Whole  43  13.29  1.00 
2  Private Label  3  Whole  78  13.51  1.48 
2  Private Label  6  Whole  78  14.78  1.52 
Note: There are altogether 57 products defined.  Prices are in cents per half a pint of milk. The fifth column 
represents the number of four-week periods that respective products were offered in the market (i.e., max of 78 in 













Table 3 Results  from the Multinomial  Logit  model of demand 
      Logit        IV Logit    
Variable  (a)  (b)  (c)  (a)  (b)  (c) 
Price  -8.440  -8.439  -8.758  -8.713  -8.712  -8.998 
  (0.215)  (0.215)  (0.205)  (0.251)  (0.251)  (0.242) 
Milkfat    -0.196  -1.077    -0.191  -1.297 
    (0.009)  (0.043)    (0.010)  (0.051) 
Mean(Income($US)/Family  size)      1.297      1.379 
      0.086      0.108 
Mean(Household  head's age)      0.535      0.857 
      0.069      0.098 
Mean(Number  of children  < 18)      1.749      1.820 
      0.097      0.106 
             
2 R   0.940  0.940  0.946       
F statistic:  Cost coefficients=0                                                                                          82.167 
Note: The dependent variable in each regression is the difference between the log of actual market shares and that 
of the outside good. All regressions include product fixed effects. 























HH head's Age  # of Child <18 
Price  -17.886
  0.134  0.198  3.351
  -5.451
 
  0.441  0.101  0.312  0.428  0.320 





  0.184  0.056  0.145  0.121  0.178 
Fat content  -0.006  -0.115
  -0.912
  -0.556  -1.014
 
  0.007  0.566  0.438  0.259  0.451 
GMM objective      752.8     
2 χ stat      6.25E+04     
Price coef.>0      0.017%     
GMM  estimates  are  obtained  based  on  4139  observations.  Bold  identifies  the  estimates  that  are  statistically 


































-60 -40 -20 0
Marginal Utility/Disutility of Price
Source: Own calculations
Milk in a Midwestern State in the U.S., 2001-2006
Distribution of Price Coefficient
 

















-10 -5 0 5
Marginal Utility/Disutility of Milkfat
Source: Own calculations
Milk in a Midwestern State in the U.S., 2001-2006
Distribution of Milkfat Coefficient
 
Table 5 Mean elasticity  estimates  for logit  and random coefficient  demand models 39 
 
   Logit  Model     RCL Model 
  Own  Cross    Own  Cross 
Manufacturer           
1  -1.325  0.017    -2.835  0.002 
2  -3.003  0.017    -2.699  0.012 
3  -3.951  0.017    -2.652  0.003 
Private label  -1.132  0.015    -2.479  0.109 
4  -3.868  0.019    -2.848  0.001 
           
Retailer chain           
Chain 1  -2.900  0.018    -2.930  0.022 
Chain 2  -1.253  0.017    -2.635  0.002 
Chain 3  -2.678  0.016    -2.564  0.068 
Chain 4  -2.838  0.016    -2.419  0.033 
           
Average all  -2.545  0.017    -2.641  0.038 




















Table 6 Vertical  Lerner Index (%) and marginal  cost (cents) across the supply  scenarios 
   Lerner  Index  Marginal  cost 
Supply scenario  Median  S.D.  Median  S.D. 
1.    Stackelberg  in Bertrand-Nash  57.1  50.3  13.4  12.8 
2.    Hybrid model (retailers  own private labels)  57.6  27.0  12.7  10.1 
3.1. Nonlinear  pricing  w/ retailers  as residual  claimants  45.5  14.7  12.6  7.0 
3.2. Nonlinear  pricing  w/ manufacturers  as residual  claimants  41.9  36.4  15.5  5.4 
4.    Manufacturer  level  collusion  40.4  78.9  10.6  16.6 
5.    Retail  level  collusion  81.2  52.6  24.0  12.7 
6.    Vertical  cartel  80.7  31.9  20.9  7.0 
Note: Lerner Indices reported above are computed as (p-c)/p , where (p-c) represents the total 
of milk manufacturer and retail chain mark -ups. 


















Table 7 Pair-wise  non-nested test for supply  scenarios   









    
                        
Test results from a restrictive  demand model       
    Hypothesis  ( 2 H )     
Hypothesis  ( 1 H )  1  2  3.1  3.2  4  5  6 
1.    Bertrand-Nash in price    1.75  0.08  -1.41  -5.70  -0.28  -0.68 
2.    Hybrid      -2.30  -4.35  -10.24  -1.95  -3.35 
3.1. Nonlinear  pricing        -1.52  -5.86  -0.36  -0.78 
3.2. Nonlinear  pricing          -3.51  0.93  0.60 
4.    Manufacturer  collusion            2.87  2.66 
5.    Retailer  collusion              -0.39 
Test results from a more general  demand model       
    Hypothesis  ( 2 H )     
Hypothesis  ( 1 H )  1  2  3.1  3.2  4  5  6 
1.    Bertrand-Nash in price    0.80  1.03  -0.65  -3.23  -0.49  0.12 
2.    Hybrid      0.26  -1.66  -4.60  -1.47  -0.77 
3.1. Nonlinear  pricing        -2.00  -5.06  -1.80  -1.08 
3.2. Nonlinear  pricing          -2.33  0.15  0.71 
4.    Manufacturer  collusion            1.83  2.23 
5.    Retailer  collusion              0.57 




Table 8 Retailer  markups for different  brand milk  under collusive  and non-collusive  scenarios 
  Manuf.  1  Manuf.  2  Manuf.  3  Manuf.  4  Manuf.  5 
  Median  SD  Median  SD  Median  SD  Median  SD  Median  SD 
Non-collusive 
models  35.6  5.0  46.1  9.9  45.2  10.5  56.0  17.6  37.7  5.8 
Collusive  models  112.0  20.6  73.1  19.5  62.5  13.7  119.8  27.1  59.6  8.7 
Source: Own calculations. 
 